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 Introduction  
 
 
 
An interrogatory has a harsh ring to it.  Commonly defined as a set 
of formal questions    submitted to an opposing party during the 
discovery phase of some legal proceeding, the procedure is grounded 
in the assumption that some wrong has occurred and that the 
responsible party needs to be identified.1  Political criticism differs 
from such an adversarial procedure but not entirely.  The most 
obvious difference is the wrongs that political criticism seeks to 
remedy are injustices, more a matter of moral and political 
responsibility than legal liability.  Becoming a party to some political 
quarrel, moreover, requires nothing more than the decision to do so 
by picking a side in some conflict.2  Yet the sharp questions ― who 
are you to rule over me? ―  that are at the center of political 
criticism resemble interrogations both in their form and tone.  Both 
legal interrogatories and political ones seek to answer such 
questions as how the benefits and burdens of social cooperation 
should be distributed and by whose authority. 
 
 
 
 
The jural world treats this last issue, authority’s legitimacy, as 
settled, but political criticism often unsettles authority’s claim to 
respect.  It is easy to see why this happens.  To demand an 
explanation and justification for the way in which the social and 
political order is arranged is to issue a presumptive challenge in 
which there is at least the suggestion that some part of that order is 
suspect.  To think, for example, about authority in an interrogatory 
mood is to imagine it as ‘guilty until proven innocent.’  Rather than 
lamenting the fact that political criticism encourages individuals to 
adopt such an accusatory tone towards social and political 
arrangements, I propose to defend it. 
 
 
 
 
Sustained rational examination of social and political practices 
always carries with it the possibility that some significant part of 
those practices will be found deeply unsatisfactory. Liberalism 
endorses this possibility, culturism prefers to delay or counter it.  
When it comes to political criticism, liberalism plays offense, 
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culturism prefers defense.  For example, culturists often object to 
liberal theories precisely because their approach to other ways of life 
is “primarily judgmental” and indicates “only a limited interest in 
understanding them.”3  Since it helps to capture the differences that 
interests me, I am going to use the term culturism ― a systematic 
devotion to culture ― to describe this alternative to liberalism as a 
posture for interrogating the social order.  The term culturism better 
conveys the presumptively high valuation of culture that is typical of 
much of the multiculturalist literature. 
 
 
 
Central to culturism as a theory of political life is a view of culture 
itself as the locus of normative meanings, e.g., intrinsic social goods, 
cultural identity, that is authoritative in the sense that it generates 
strong claims for respecting the various practices and conventions 
that constitute it.  We can call this a standard of presumptive 
respect.  The standard works within culturist writings to encourage 
deference towards other cultures and communities, especially 
nonliberal ones, because their practices are ‘simply theirs.’  
Liberalism, in contrast, is harder on social and political life, pressing 
culturists for an answer to the question “why respect culture?”4 
 
 
 
 
Culture matters for how people live their lives.  It binds us together 
through the ties of language and history, it shapes how others see us, 
and it provides many with “the safety of effortless secure 
belonging.”5  That cultures matter in these ways or that culture is a 
social fact is beyond dispute.  Culturists are right to remind us of 
them.  What is disputable is whether culture is a moral fact with 
unambiguous implications for how we should go about interrogating 
either cultures or the wider political setting of which they are a 
part.6 
 
 
 
 
Culturists typically begin with the premise that we owe equal respect 
to all cultures.  Bhikhu Parekh take this to mean that we should not 
use liberal values of personal autonomy or freedom of choice as key 
standards for judging a culture’s practices.  Liberal justificatory 
demands, he argues, reflect a moral monism that is incapable of 
seeing that “the good life can be lived in several more or less equally 
worthwhile ways.”7  While some liberal thinkers such as Will 
Kymlicka have sought to parry this complaint by developing a liberal 
theory of multiculturalism, my aims are different.8  It is the 
contrasts between liberalism and culturism as models of political 
criticism that I aim to describe.  Once we have some key differences 
between liberal and culturist visions of social and political 
justification before us, I turn to a discussion of to Azar Nafisi’s book 
Reading Lolita in Tehran to defend the first and criticize the second, 
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of which more later.9 
 
 
 
What commonly encourages critics to interrogate politics is one of 
two things.  For many it is a sense of injustice, the belief that people 
are being so badly mistreated that they are victims.  Others 
interrogate politics less to uncover injustices than to uncover the 
elemental or foundational nature of justice in the hope that politics 
can satisfy or honor its ethical demands.  The first project speaks to 
our fears about politics when it goes badly.  It rests upon the feeling 
that people are more likely to have a sense of what is unjust about 
their circumstances than a fully developed sense of the nature of a 
just society.  The second motive for interrogating politics is more 
ambitious precisely because the question of the just society defines 
its project. 
 
 
 
 
If so inclined, one can divide liberalisms according to whether they 
take injustice or justice as their major topic, distinguishing the 
liberalism of fear from neo-Kantian liberalisms.10  Alternatively one 
might divide liberal camps into contextualists and foundationalists.  
A contextualist might ask, “Does this social order rest upon shared 
understandings that include my expectations and my life story?”  
The foundationalist, on the other hand, would ask, “Could I consent 
or agree to this social order.”  These are choppy waters, and I try to 
sail around them by keeping in view features that distinguish 
liberalism as political criticism from culturism. 
 
 
 
 
The contrasts drawn do not apply only to liberalism and culturism.  
In a broad way, they could also be used to characterize the 
differences between early social contract theory and, say, Burke’s 
conservatism.  Where the contract theorists sought to pull back 
ideological curtains so as to get a closer look at the beliefs, customs, 
and experiences purporting to underwrite the legitimacy of 
authority, Burke was equally certain that the state’s survival 
depended upon keeping most of this hidden.11  The choice between 
transparency and opacity is being replayed today in the differences 
between liberalism and culturism. 
 
 
 
 Liberalism  
 
 
 
Liberalism seen as a justificatory strategy deploys two core values ― 
transparency and individualism ― as standards for judging the 
social order.  The importance of individualism first appears in 
liberal theories as a demand that social and political practices 
should be interrogated from the standpoint of anyone who is part of 
them.  What is often known today as the politics of difference, giving 
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pride of place to particular identities, liberals consider an obstacle to 
greater transparency. 
 
 
 
Consider the proto-liberal Hobbes’s observation that in order for the 
social contract to be effective “every man [must] acknowledge 
another for his equal by nature.”12  Whether counted a moral or 
prudential rule, what is called for here is the recognition and 
affirmation of each individual’s worth.  Behind that proposal is 
Hobbes’s warning that preoccupation with one’s particular identity 
can become an obsession.  Individuals overly concerned about their 
relative social status, he noted, are too quick to see in their 
differences occasions for slights and affronts.  The desire for 
recognition by some too easily becomes the demand for deference 
from others.  The moral Hobbes draws and one that many liberals 
have drawn since is that indifference towards our more particular 
identities can promote recognition of each person’s equal standing 
qua subject and citizen. 
 
 
 
 
Sounding a different note but making a similar point, Locke argued 
that, “Men being, as has been said, by Nature, all free, equal and 
independent, no one can be put out of this Estate, and subjected to 
the Political Power of another, without his own Consent.”13  Exactly 
how consent is expressed is something about which liberal theorists 
have been understandably divided.  Since consent is bound up with 
notions of  human agency, freedom, and the capacity of individuals 
to engage in intentional actions, consent is very much a “cluster 
concept” and like all such concepts, its meaning will depend upon 
how “the broader conceptual system within which it is implicated” is 
elaborated.14 
 
 
 
 
A voluntaristic account of consent is the most difficult to imagine, 
since it requires that political arrangements in some meaningful 
sense reflect the individual’s will.  So far as I know, the only major 
effort by a liberal thinker to normatively theorize political life from 
this standpoint is to be found in the recent work of Richard 
Flathman.  Arguing that freedom presupposes that we can make 
meaningful distinctions between “voluntary action and compelled, 
coerced, or manipulated movement or behavior,” he reconfigures 
consent as a claim about the good of voluntarism.  “‘Voluntary’ in 
this regard means both that the actions taken are not coerced or 
compelled by other agents or agencies and that they occur because 
of the choices and decisions of the individuals whose conduct it is, 
because of desires and interests, beliefs, values and reasons that are 
in some sense the individual’s own.”15  Flathman’s point reminds us 
not only of why liberals embrace individuality but why they view 
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voluntary associations more favorably than ascriptive ones and 
divided selves more favorably  than unitary ones. 
 
 
 
The self, Michael Walzer writes, “answers to many names, defining 
itself now in terms of family, nation, religion, gender, political 
commitment, and so on.  It identifies itself with different histories, 
traditions, rituals, and, above all, with different groups of people, 
incorporated, as it were, into a wider selfhood.”16  The self, on these 
readings, is not an identity but a process of self-making that occurs, 
in part, through a negotiation of its existing affiliations and 
additional aspirations for itself.  Self-criticism is one way in which 
the self negotiates its plurality.  Political criticism is another and 
aims at identifying the power of others to constrain these 
possibilities.  For culturists (and some liberals), these are unsettling 
observations.  They effectively assert that identity categories may 
themselves be artifacts of assigned positions and asymmetries of 
power.  Liberal interrogations encourage efforts to determine when 
this is the case.  Not surprisingly, the culturist seeks to replace them 
with other criteria for judging the social order. 
 
 
 
 
In any justificatory strategy, it is always a matter of some 
importance to determine how it calls forth the we that is expected to 
be persuaded by its more substantive conclusions.  No justification 
is “ours” until we have persuaded others so that they can become 
everyone’s.  There is no “I” immune from criticism, no “we” without 
mutual interrogation.  While stated in the more osmotic language of 
foundational reasoning, the conditions defining the original position 
in John Rawls’s contract theory promote the same point.  In arguing 
from the original position, he writes, “justification includes 
everything that we would say ― you and I ― when we set up justice 
as fairness and reflect why we proceed in one way rather than 
another.”17  Rawls labels this the “condition of publicity.”  By this he 
means to exclude conceptions of justice that depend upon 
ideological delusions or illusions that foreclose the possibility of 
mutual agreement and “mutual recognition.”18  Working within the 
social-contract tradition, Rawls in effect says that people cannot be 
asked to enter into an agreement about the principles that will 
govern their life together unless they have full knowledge of the 
commitments that those principles will demand of them.  The 
principle of publicity means that the basic structure of the political 
order “should stand up to public scrutiny” so that it does not 
“depend on historically accidental or established delusions, or other 
mistaken beliefs resting on the deceptive appearances of institutions 
that mislead us as to how they work.”19  Transparency or publicity 
aims to defeat institutional opacity.  Success on this score is a chief 
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moment in the public conception of the autonomous individual.20 
 
 
 
When undertaken from the standpoint of ‘everyman,’ liberal 
political criticism aims to make what was previously opaque 
transparent.  Transparency, Jeremy Waldron writes, means that the 
social order “must be one that can be justified to the people who live 
under it.  . . . Society should be a transparent order, in the sense 
that its workings and principles should be well-known and available 
for public apprehension and scrutiny.  People should know and 
understand the reasons for the basic distribution of wealth, power, 
authority, and freedom.  Society should not be shrouded in mystery, 
and its workings should not have to depend on mythology, 
mystification, or a ‘noble lie.’”21 
 
 
 
 
As a justificatory standard and as a desired state of affairs, 
transparency is, of course, elusive.  Since institutions and practices 
can mislead in a variety of ways, it is unrealistic to imagine that their 
opacity can ever be overcome once and for all.  Participants in some 
practice or institution rarely can see all of the implications of their 
participation.  I often remind my students that many of their 
activities such as working for a wage or getting married reproduce 
the institutions of capitalism and marriage, respectively.  Their 
failure to notice this is an innocent one but one for which capitalists 
and social conservatives are arguably grateful.   One of the functions 
of political criticism, however, is precisely to expand the causal 
context in which people form judgments about what they have done 
or what has been done to them.  Incomplete understandings of the 
by-products of their actions, self-deception, ideological distortions, 
psychological and cultural conditioning: all can affect how clearly 
participants in a practice see its meaning.  All of this points to the 
problematic relationship between knowledge and power.  The more 
opaque the circumstances in which individuals must willy-nilly act, 
the more the choices underwriting their actions are impaired.  The 
norms that belong to some social or cultural practice always enable 
and disable. 
 
 
 
 
Conceived  both as a justificatory standard and as a desirable state of 
affairs, transparency is the easy ally of liberal individualism.  The 
argument that the social order should be transparent presupposes 
that it is in the interest of individuals for it to be so.  Anything that 
impairs their self-understanding or their knowledge of the 
constraints that restrict their range of action weakens their capacity 
for choice.  A self-justifying society, one concerned with the 
legitimacy of its collective decisions and the consequences of various 
ways of life for the life of its members, can hardly be anything other 
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than a society in which individuals are at least presented with the 
opportunity to become self-justifying as well.  For individuals to 
increase control over their lives, they will also have to gain some 
greater control over their social world. 
 
 
 
A chief way in which the idea of culture appears in liberalism 
conceived as a strategy of justification is in the advice that care 
should be taken to encourage a culture that promotes interrogation 
of the social order.  The interrogation of social and political power is 
done by individuals and always goes better, as J. S. Mill constantly 
insisted, when it becomes a social practice and the means for its 
practice are kept close at hand.  Transparency, including how one 
relates to their own beliefs, is a product of our disagreements.  
Membership in a liberal culture means being a critic and being 
among those criticized.  Transparency is carried along by a culture of 
complaints and grievances. 
 
 
 
 Culturism  
 
 
 
There are several ways in which one might juxtapose liberalism and 
culturism.  Moving from the specific to the more abstract, one could 
begin with any number of specific controversies that revolve around 
the question of how far a liberal order can or should go in 
accommodating cultural diversity.  I have in mind such things as the 
relief sought by Amish parents in America from public school laws 
requiring that children attend school through the age of sixteen, 
relief granted by the United States Supreme Court in the case of 
Wisconsin v. Yoder.  Similar issues about cultural accommodation 
surround the effort by some Sikhs who have sought and in some 
cases won an exemption from laws banning weapons in public 
places so that they might carry a ceremonial dagger with religious 
significance.  More famous is the l’affaire du foulard of 1989 when 
French officials expelled three young girls from school for wearing 
the traditional Muslim head scarf, or chador.22 
 
 
 
 
While these issues often have their origins in the specific demands 
of some members of a particular culture so that they end up being 
conceived as cases in search of a judicial ruling, they quite quickly 
and inevitably require both liberals and culturists to consider the 
principles that should be controlling in such judgements.  
Liberalism, for example, can easily endorse the state granting some 
exceptions to its laws; it frequently does so.  Culturists, however, 
might very well reject this strategy of granting exceptions insofar as 
it reinforces the ruling liberal principles, e.g., tolerance, equal 
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treatment, that give rise to the need for them. 
 
 
 
At the most abstract level, we are then confronted with a choice, 
Charles Taylor argues, between liberal politics of equal dignity and a 
multiculturalist politics of unique identity:  
 
 
 
the modern notion of identity has given rise to a politics 
of difference.  . . . Everyone should be recognized for his 
or her unique identity.  But recognition here means 
something else.  With the politics of equal dignity, what 
is established is meant to be universally the same, an 
identical basket of rights and immunities; with the 
politics of difference, what we are asked to recognize is 
the unique identity of this individual or group, their 
distinctness from everyone else.  For one, the principle 
of equal respect requires that we treat people in a 
difference-blind fashion.  The fundamental intuition 
that humans command this respect focuses on what is 
the same in all.  For the other, we have to recognize and 
even foster particularity.23 
 
 
 
 
Culturists often map their quarrels with liberalism on the terrain set 
out by Taylor’s distinction between two versions of the politics of 
recognition.  Variously termed “the politics of recognition,” “the 
politics of difference,” “multicultural citizenship,” a large and 
growing literature now exists that attempts to diminish, correct, or 
revise liberal values in light of “the claims of culture.”24  Taylor’s 
argument that culture itself generates normative claims that merit 
recognition is central to these developments. 
 
 
 
 
Restricting my comments to the implications of culturism for 
political criticism arguably misses much that is important in this 
literature.  At the very least, culturism has reaffirmed the social 
constructivist’s claim that social rules and behaviors often take on a 
life of their own and become constitutive not only of what we are 
allowed to do but of whom we are allowed to be.  The most relevant 
point of constructivism to the politics of culture is its location of the 
self in a web of power relations.  If the formation of the self takes 
place in response to the pressures and normative meanings provided 
by its culture, society, practices, and institutions, the individual is 
confronted with the task of balancing, endorsing, accepting, 
rejecting, and negotiating their place in these multiple and different 
locations.  Not everyone will take up these tasks.  The identity of 
those who do so is not a thing but a critical activity.  Culturists, 
however, make this task more difficult.  That difficulty can be traced 
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to their tendency to cast the idea of culture at a very abstract level 
where unwelcome attributes are drained off.  Abstraction is a key 
strategy for privileging culture so that it is given greater priority 
than the liberal values of transparency and individualism. 
 
 
 
We can see the strategy of abstraction at work in Charles Taylor’s 
conception of culture as a locus of normative values that are 
“undecomposable” into individual goods, e.g., solidarity, cultural 
identity.  “If these things are goods, then other things being equal so 
is the culture that makes them possible.  If I want to maximize these 
goods, then I must want to preserve and strengthen this culture.  
But the culture as a good, or more cautiously, as the locus of some 
goods ( for there might be much that is reprehensible as well) is not 
an individual good.  . . . The idea that the culture is only valuable 
instrumentally in this kind of case rests on a confusion.”25  As 
numerous writers have noted, Taylor effectively looks at cultures in 
a holistic way that often overrides concern with how individuals 
position and reposition themselves in relationship to a culture’s 
practices. 
 
 
 
 
The drive to abstraction in Taylor’s thought is also evident when he 
takes up the notion of linguistic communities as being a culture in 
which self only exists as part of a “web of interlocutors.”26  That 
language plays an important role in the discursive formation of one’s 
identity is not an issue.  It is easy to concede the point.  More 
contestable is the way in which phrases such as “web of 
interlocutors” flatten out what is going on in the conversations that 
are part of cultural life.  “From the general principle,” Seyla 
Benhabib objects, “that all human identities are linguistically 
constructed, no argument can be derived about which webs of 
interlocution should be normatively privileged, and under which 
circumstances and by whom.”27  Any effort to answer Benhabib’s 
questions would require interrogating how and why some 
discursively formed identities prevail while others lose.  Sharp 
questions about winners and losers reference the fate of individual 
members of a culture.  Yet Taylor’s earlier insistence that culture has 
an intrinsic worth that cannot be judged in terms of its effects upon 
individual well-being blocks or, at the very least, discourages such 
critical interrogations.  The category of an “undecomposable” 
cultural good in this context does important justificatory work by 
inviting an understanding of culture as “one for all, and all for one.”  
When the culturist talks (frequently) about how cultures enable 
some possibilities and foreclose others (infrequently), he or she is 
likely to assign this sorting to culture as an ontological category 
rather than to the competing narratives of cultural members or 
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struggles over how to distribute cultural symbols. 
 
 
 
Will Kymlicka similarly deploys a strategy of abstraction to argue for 
the intrinsic value of culture.  He accomplishes this by drawing a 
distinction between a culture’s “structure” and its “character.”  This 
permits him to repeat Taylor’s treatment of culture as a settled 
singularity, marginalizing the lived plurality of cultures. Since he 
presents his work as an effort to develop a liberal theory of 
multiculturalism, Kymlicka starts out on a liberal note.  His writings 
frequently discuss how cultures can oppress some of their 
members.  This explains the restrictions attached to his argument 
for extending group rights to certain minority cultures.  Group 
rights should not prevent cultural members from having a right to 
exit nor should they restrict “the right of group members to question 
and revise traditional authorities and practices.” 
 
 
 
 
Since this position is largely indistinguishable from liberal or 
democratic accounts of how much freedom of association members 
of a culture should enjoy, Kymlicka needs an addition in order to 
reestablish the priority of culture as a good in itself.  He 
accomplishes this by arguing that we need to “distinguish the 
existence of a culture from its ‘character’ at any given moment.”  
Cultural members should enjoy freedom of choice, but the value of 
culture itself is independent of this individual guarantee.  We 
should, he argues, be concerned 
 
 
 
 
with the fate of cultural structures, not because they 
have some moral status of their own, but because it’s 
only through having a rich and secure cultural structure 
that people can become aware, in a vivid way, of the 
options available to them, and intelligently examine 
their value. . . . A societal culture. . . provides its 
members with meaningful ways of life across the full 
range of human activities, including social, educational, 
religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing 
both public and private spheres. Cultural membership 
provides us with an intelligible context of choice, and a 
secure sense of identity and belonging, that we call 
upon in confronting questions about personal values 
and projects.28 
 
 
 
 
Kymlicka’s concept of a societal culture is fashioned out of a sharp 
disjunction between subjective and objective criteria for reading a 
culture’s meaning.  This is most evident in his use of territory and 
language to distinguish between the culture of national minorities, 
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on the one hand, and the culture of ethnic groups, on the other.  
Societal culture is described using similar objective and holistic 
criteria.  The more subjective disagreements among a culture’s 
members or the ways in which power is used to distribute identity 
are marginalized by being assigned to its “character.”  As James 
Johnson observes, “It is fairly easy to respect culture on the account 
Kymlicka gives simply because he so thoroughly de-politicizes it.”29 
 
 
 
Among culturists, Parekh may be the most keen to privilege cultural 
practices even or especially when they disable liberal notions of 
equality, autonomy, or the idea that people should be free to 
challenge their social roles.  To protect cultural practices from such 
liberal interrogations, Parekh needs some strategy for dismissing the 
liberal complaint that some cultural identities may be enforced or 
assigned rather than simply register a valued way of being one sort 
of self rather than another.  The key to this strategy is an insistence 
upon not seeing a culture as a voluntary association, thereby 
diminishing the relevance of individual choice. 
 
 
 
 
In a response to Susan Okin’s argument that “multiculturalism is 
bad for women,” he allows that some women may be “indoctrinated” 
or even “brainwashed” to accept cultural practices that discriminate 
against them.  On the other hand, he is, I think, right to criticize 
Okin for too quickly dismissing cultural practices that she finds 
offensive as instances of “false consciousness.”  So it is a matter of 
some interest to know whether individuals embrace or endorse a 
particular cultural identity and when they might, if conditions 
permitted, reject it. 
 
 
 
 
There is the additional tension between the identity embraced by 
group members and the identity assigned them by group 
opponents.  “You say you are a Choctaw, but do the Choctaws say 
so?  The Catholics claim you, but do you claim them?  The Apartheid 
government declared you to be colored, whether you did or not.”30  
This conflict between chosen identities and assigned identities 
describes a key feature of the politics of culture.  If cultural identity 
is an important good, its formation, how it is distributed, and by 
whose authority become matters for political inquiry and criticism.  
This, I worry, is exactly what the culturist seeks to avoid. 
 
 
 
 
While Parekh, in his criticism of Okin, encourages us to believe that 
the authenticity of cultural membership is a genuine problem, 
addressing this problem is next to impossible within the terms of his 
discussion of what culture means. In Rethinking Multiculturalism, 
he starts out by contrasting the thin diversity endorsed by liberal 
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individualism with the “deeper cultural diversity” in which cultures 
themselves are conceived of as “self-determining collective 
subjects.” The problem with liberalism is that it turns collectives 
into voluntary associations and dismisses “the cultural aspirations of 
such communities as the indigenous peoples, national minorities, 
subnational groups, and the immigrants.” He is especially keen to 
insist that “A cultural community performs a role in human life that 
a voluntary association cannot.  It gives its members a sense of 
rootedness, existential stability, the feeling of belonging to an 
ongoing community of ancient and misty origins, and ease of 
communication.  And it does all this only because it is not a 
conscious human creation and one’s membership in it is neither a 
matter of choice nor can be easily terminated by oneself or 
others.”31  The contrast between community (non-voluntarism) and 
association (voluntarism) overlays Taylor’s distinction between 
social goods and individual (decomposable) goods. 
 
 
 
In Rethinking Multiculturalism, Parekh considers alternative liberal 
arguments for valuing culture.  He notes Joseph Raz’s instrumental 
defense of culture as important to people’s sense of secure 
belonging.  It is the instrumentalism of this formulation to which he 
then objects.  Parekh declines to join liberals in inviting cultural 
members to consider when they have “rational and valid” reasons 
for valuing their culture. 
 
 
 
 
This is one way of relating to one’s culture but not the 
only one.  For some people their culture is a trust to be 
cherished, for others an inheritance to be enjoyed and 
suitably adjusted to changing circumstances, for yet 
others too constitutive of their identity to permit the 
kind of detachment that Raz’s view requires.  . . . 
Furthermore, to say that one should love one’s culture 
for the right reasons or that one’s love should be 
rational and valid implies that one’s relation to one’s 
culture is external and contingent and that one’s love of 
it is conditional, a reward for its good points.  To love a 
culture (or anything or any one) for the good in it is to 
love the latter not the culture itself, and entails the 
untenable view that one could or even should transfer 
one’s love to another if that seemed better.32 
 
 
 
 
This is a very odd comment.  It effectively equates the unqualified 
commitment to another that is a mark of personal intimacy (and 
why should even that be unqualified?) with a person’s love of an  
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abstraction, a culture that might, among other things, include 
relations with others who mistrust and dislike me.  Perhaps, it is the 
very oddity of the equation that explains Parekh’s inability to 
imagine someone falling out of love. 
 
 
 
Lastly I return to the culturist’s starting point; namely, the argument 
for extending presumptive respect to cultures.  The principle starts 
out as an appeal to the principle, shared by many liberals, that every 
human being is entitled to equal respect.  A culturist spin is applied 
to the principle by transferring the respect to which the individual is 
entitled to culture itself.  James Tully’s statement is fairly typical:  
“the social basis of this threshold sense of self-respect is that others 
recognize the values of one’s activities and goals.  . . . Since what a 
person says and does and the plans he or she formulates and revises 
are partly characterized by his or her cultural identity, the condition 
of self-respect is met only in a society in which the cultures of all 
members are recognized and affirmed by others, both by those who 
do and those who do not share these cultures.”33  Tully asks a great 
deal of individuals insofar as he expects that those who are in most 
ways unalike will nonetheless affirm the value of beliefs, ways of life, 
dietary habits, religious rituals that appear strange to those on the 
outside.  In fact, almost everything we know about how members of 
a culture police the borders separating them from other cultures 
argues for considerable pessimism about this possibility.34 
 
 
 
 
My more limited purpose, however, is to call attention to how his 
comments also discourage criticism of cultures either in the name of 
greater transparency or individual agency.  Tully’s standard of equal 
recognition displaces the notion that everyone is entitled to equal 
treatment regardless of ascribed characteristics by making 
“recognition and affirmation” of those characteristics markers of our 
respect for others.  Rather than interrogating culture, the culturist 
assigns us the fairly daunting task of recognizing and respecting 
cultural practices ranging from dietary habits to religious beliefs 
with which we cannot be expected to identify.  The very fact that the 
worth of a way of life is a function of shared experiences means that 
others who have not had those experiences will not be able to judge 
their worth in the same way.  To a liberal, this argues against 
making our respect for others conditional upon our willingness to 
recognize and affirm the value of their differences.  The culturist, on 
the other hand, uses such facts about the differences among cultures 
to argue that the differences themselves are entitled to equal respect, 
i.e., should have normative force for the actions of others.  In this 
case, it is clear that this means deferring to rather than interrogating 
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culture. 
 
 
 Azar Nafisi, Reading Lolita in Tehran  
 
 
 
Azar Nafisi is a Professor of English literature.  She left Iran at the 
age of thirteen and was educated in the West, earning her graduate 
degree from the University of Oklahoma.  In 1979, she returned 
home to Iran to become part of the English faculty at the University 
of Tehran.  After fifteen difficult and contentious years culminating 
in her refusal to continue wearing the veil on campus and in her 
classes, one of many conflicts with her employers at the University 
of Tehran and later at Allameh University, she resigned her last post 
under pressure. 
 
 
 
 
It was ironic that Mr. Bahri, the defender of the faith, 
described the veil as a piece of cloth.  I had to remind 
him that we had to have more respect for that “piece of 
cloth” than to force it on reluctant people.  . . . A stern 
ayatollah, a blind and improbable philosopher-king, 
had decided to impose his dream on a country and to 
re-create us in his own myopic vision.  So he had 
formulated an ideal of me as a Muslim woman, as a 
Muslim woman teacher, and wanted me to look, and in 
short live according to that ideal. Laleh and I, in 
refusing to accept that ideal, were taking not a political 
stance, but an existential one.  No, I could tell Mr. 
Bahri, it was not that piece of cloth that I rejected, it 
was the transformation being imposed upon me that 
made me look in the mirror and hate the stranger I had 
become.35 
 
 
 
 
Cut off from access to students through a University appointment, 
she invited seven of her best and most committed female graduate 
students to come together as a class in her home every Thursday 
morning to discuss some of the greatest works of Western 
literature:  Lolita, Invitation to a Beheading, The Great Gatsby, 
Pride and Prejudice.   This secret class of women, inviting men 
would have been too dangerous, met for almost two years.  Nafisi 
tells the story of their time together against the background of the 
Iranian government’s efforts to use Islam to consolidate its power.  
It is, as her subtitle records, “ A Memoir in Books.”  
 
 
 
 
Nafisi’s book can and should be read in any number of ways.  At one 
level, it is a sympathetic and deeply engaging recounting of the  
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efforts by her young Iranian students to manage the conflicts arising 
out of the demands placed upon them in the new Iran, an Iran in 
which they are widely treated as inferior to men.  It is also about the 
power of literature to transform lives by leading individuals, Henry 
James’s words, to enjoy “the aggression of infinite modes of being.”  
“Readers,” Nabokov’s words, “are born free and they ought to 
remain free.”  In one of many interviews that she has given, Nafisi 
summarized the lessons of those Thursday morning classes:  
“Austen told us that a woman has the right to choose the man she 
wants to marry, against all authority.  Nabokov taught us that people 
have a right to retrieve the reality totalitarian mindsets have taken 
away from them.  That is why works of imagination, especially 
fiction, have become so vital today in Iran.  . . . Americans gifts to us 
have been Lolita and Gatsby.”36 
 
 
 
Above all, it is the work of Nabokov’s Lolita that powers Nafisi’s 
memoir.  She leads her students (did they find their own way?) to 
see that Humbert’s mocking criticisms of Lolita, even giving her a 
new name, are efforts to re-create her according to his fantasies and 
imagination.  She is his victim; the crime is identity theft.  “The 
desperate truth of Lolita’s story is not the rape of a twelve-year-old 
by a dirty old man but the confiscation of one individual’s life by 
another.”  For Nafisi, her students are similarly oppressed by a 
regime that seeks “to make their personal identities and histories 
irrelevant.  They were never free of the regime’s definition of them 
as Muslim women.”37 
 
 
 
 
At the end of Nafisi’s book, she and most of her students have left 
Iran; Nafisi for Johns Hopkins University in the United States, 
Nassrin for England, Mitra to Canada, Azin starting over in 
California, Yassi was admitted to Rice University in Texas, Nima and 
Manna continue on in Iran.  One might, I suppose, say of those who 
left Iran that they exercised their right of exit, a right often used by 
both liberals and culturists to distinguish between oppressive and 
non-oppressive groups.  It is an odd test.  Aside from the difficulty of 
choosing to be free in this way, the test scores a life’s success by 
undercounting its losses.  “‘But for you, at least, wearing the veil is 
natural; it’s your religion, your choice.’”  “‘My choice,’ said Mahshid 
with a laugh. ‘What else do I have but my religion, and if I Iose that . 
. .’”38 
 
 
 
 
Mashid’s comment expresses a frustration with identity politics.  
Nafisi’s students do not escape identity categories ― religion, 
gender, culture ― but they cannot be reduced to them.  Confronted 
with the honesty of their imaginations through literature, they (we) 
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come to recognize their lives as a project. Nafisi’s book helps us to 
see the relationships and interactions with others that shape 
identity.  In this sense, the culturist is correct to treat culture as 
something that distributes important social and individual goods ― 
solidarity and personal identity.  The liberal seems to me equally 
correct to ask who does the distributing and are some substantially 
more powerful than others to affect the process. 
 
 
 
Nafisi’s book, then, is about the politics of culture.  There is an 
obvious and less obvious way in which this is true.  Because it is 
about life in Iran after the Islamic Revolution, many of the conflicts 
recorded in the book are a result of the politicization of culture by 
elites ambitious to attain power and legitimize their position.  On 
this reading, Nafisi’s book might be judged as most successful as a 
complaint about political not cultural oppression.  Privileging 
cultures and cultural identity is not the problem.  The problem is the 
hijacking of cultural symbols and practices by an unaccountable 
government.  This seems to me true and potentially misleading.  It is 
true about the ways in which a culture’s meanings, e.g., the veil, the 
burqa, can be exploited by some (usually men) to control and coerce 
others (usually women).  The oppression is the same whether it is 
the Shah of Iran’s policy of the mandatory deveiling of Muslim 
women or their mandatory reveiling by the next regime.  It would be 
a mistake, however, to read Nafisi’s complaints about the 
politicization of culture as exhausting the ways in which cultural 
identity is a problem for politics . There is more to it.  Identity 
formation is about knowledge and power.  Knowledge of the social 
order, both its limits and possibilities, matters.  Somewhere between 
the constraints of social practices, institutions, and culture and the 
individuals freedom and power to respond, reject, and rearrange 
those constraints is where personal identity takes shape. 
 
 
 
 
The culturists’s mistake is to speak about identity categories as 
though they are clear and fixed.  Ambivalence and ambiguity are 
dissolved into clear categories.  One can say these things; Nafisi’s 
students, however, could not live them.  Each in her separate way is 
confronted with the task of discovering and constructing an 
identity.  This assignment was not handed out in class.  It was and is 
work done in response to the conflicts arising out of the expectations 
that they have for themselves and the expectations that others ― 
parents, boyfriends, teachers, censors, and the police ― have for 
them.  In a culture that values self-justification and the right to 
demand a justification for why things should be arranged in such a 
way to create such pressures, self-making could hardly be 
considered easy.  It could approximate honesty.  In Nafisi’s Iran, this 
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was one choice or way of being in the world that culture and politics 
conspired to prevent.  Becoming a good liar is one of the ‘identities’ 
that begins to make sense.  Nassrin, one of the students, lied to her 
father so as to cover her time spent in the class.  “She lived in so 
many parallel worlds:  the so-called real world of her family, work 
and society; the secret world of our class and her young man; and 
the world she had created out of her lies.”39 
 
 
 
Through their study of literature, Nafisi’s students redefine or, more 
accurately, uncover the politics of culture.  There is the open 
problem of how to deal with the government’s effort to force an 
identity upon them in the name of Islam.  This gives rise to familiar 
struggles against censorship. 
 
 
 
 
One incident, partly amusing, mostly disturbing, occurs when 
Nafisi, when she was still teaching at the University, invites some of 
her more militant students to put The Great Gatsby on trial.  The 
indictment, as recounted by Nafisi, is as clumsy as any offered in an 
ideological trial.  Gatsby’s materialism, adultery, his carelessness, 
the attraction of Daisy’s money for him are odes to Western 
decadence. Nafisi, in contrast, articulates a compelling view of 
Gatsby as a dreamer who is doomed by the honesty of his own 
imagination, his dream is the wish that he can neither have nor 
abandon. 
 
 
 
 
It is, however, two comments of Nafisi’s students in defense of the 
novel that speak against the project of conceiving culture as a thing, 
as “actually evolved.”  Argues one student:  “‘Our dear prosecutor 
has committed the fallacy of getting too close to the amusement 
park.  . . . He can no longer distinguish fiction from reality.  . . . He 
leaves no space, no breathing room, between the two worlds.  He has 
demonstrated his own weakness:  an inability to read a novel on its 
own terms.’”  But Nafisi reports that another student observes 
quietly:  “This is an amazing book.  . . . It teaches you to value your 
dreams but to be wary of them also, to look for integrity in unusual 
places.”40  Nafisi and her students are remarking on the ways in 
which choices can be suppressed and alternatives unconsidered.  
Literature exposes both cover-ups.  Novels create “counter-realities” 
that restore the capacity to become an agent.  It is not so much that 
her students lose themselves in literature.  Rather it is how they find 
a self of their own making. 
 
 
 
 
The interrogation of cultures in the name of the liberal values of 
transparency and individualism requires overriding culturism’s 
presumptive principle of according all cultures equal respect.  That  
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principle, as noted earlier, starts out as a fairly standard liberal 
claim that individuals deserve equal respect, at least as regards their 
standing in the political order.  Charles Taylor then carries this 
forward in two steps.  First, we should respect “the potential for 
forming and defining one’s own identity, as an individual, and also 
as a culture.”  And this requires a next step of according “equal 
respect to actually evolved cultures.”  Aside from, again, the drive to 
abstraction and holistic concepts (“actually evolved cultures”), 
Taylor’s defense of the principle of presumptive respect depends 
upon our willingness to treat personal identity and cultural identity 
as belonging to the same sort of formative process.  The only way to 
do this is to concede his claim that culture is an “undecomposable” 
good so that the good of the culture is the individual’s good. 
 
 
 
Looked at either from the perspective of the culture or one of its 
members, you get two for one ― culture and identity, ‘the unity of 
the knower and the known.’  Or, in Taylor’s admiring quotation of 
Rousseau, “a society with a common purpose, one in which there is a 
“’we’” that is an ‘I’, and an ‘I’ that is a ‘we’.”41  Parekh argues that 
liberals fail to take cultural diversity seriously because they take 
individual diversity too seriously.  The success of this formula ― the 
culture or the individual, take your pick ― depends upon a 
willingness to treat the diversity that shows up in the differences 
between cultures as being fundamentally more important than the 
diversity within a culture.  This, in turn, requires jumping over the 
concrete relationships and special attachments of everyday life to get 
to the abstract claims made in the name of cultures as sociological 
wholes. 
 
 
 
 
Literature in Nafisi’s telling puts the lie to these notions of identity 
as a settled singularity.  Her students lives cannot be fitted to a 
unified pattern, there is no single identity that answers to the 
question ‘who is she.’ 
 
 
 
 
Nor should Nafisi’s book be read as a rejection of culture.  Rather it 
is about pluralizing culture, so as to create a place where oppositions 
“do not need to eliminate each other in order to exist.”42  She would, 
I think, agree with Andrea Baumeister’s warning about culturism: 
 
 
 
 
A preoccupation with cultural identity may not only 
restrict the freedom of future generations, but may also 
prove oppressive vis-à-vis existing group members.  
Even if individual rights are respected a “politics of 
cultural survival” may lead to pressure being placed 
upon membership rather than a whole host of 
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alternative criteria which may shape her identity.  After 
all, our cultural identity constitutes only one influence 
upon our conception of the good life.  . . . our 
occupation, social status, and choice of neighborhood 
all contribute to our sense of self and conception of the 
good life.43 
 
 
 
None of us can be entirely free to manage those competing demands 
in any way that we choose; institutions and practices constrain what 
can be done and even what can be imagined.  It is, however, one of 
liberalism’s most important achievements to have problematized 
such arrangements by encouraging interrogation of them.44 
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